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RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 
     This appeal comes to us from the Tax Court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor 
of the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS").  At the heart of this appeal is 
the Tax Court's 
refusal to permit the taxpayers, Richard and Bette Tolve, to withdraw 
their deemed 
admissions and to amend their pleadings so as to raise a statute of 
limitations defense as 
to the IRS's claim for additions to tax and interest.  They claim that the 
consent form only 
waived the statute of limitations regarding the amount of the tax itself, 
and also that the 
statute of limitations had run regarding any tax liability of Bette Tolve 
because she did 
not sign the consent form at all.  The Tax Court refused to permit 
withdrawal of the 
admissions and granted the IRS's motion for summary judgment.  We will 
affirm. 
                               I. 
     As we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the events 
that concern us, 
we will only note those facts that are particularly relevant to our 
ruling.  On their joint 
federal income tax return for 1981, the Tolves reported losses and credits 
that flowed 
through to them under 701 from a partnership called Stu-Co Energy 
Associates 
("Stu-Co").  As part of a broader tax shelter examination, the Tolves' 
1981 tax return was 
audited.  As part of this audit, on February 27, 1985, an IRS Form 872-A 
(the "Consent") 
was submitted to the IRS with the purported signatures of both Richard and 
Bette Tolve.  
It is uncontested that the purpose of this form was to extend the statute 
of limitations 
regarding "tax" deficiency; it is disputed what the term "tax," as used in 
this Consent, 
means.  The form was a standard IRS form, but contained typed language 
limiting the 
"amount of any deficiency assessment to that resulting from" six different 
items, none of 
which reference additions to tax or interest. 
     Three and a half years later, in September, 1999, counsel for the 
Commissioner 
sent a series of letters and requests to the Tolves in an effort to 
prepare the case for trial, 
then set for January 10, 2000.   After several misdirected communications, 
on 
November 17, 1999, a request for admissions, as well as all other 
documents previously 
sent to a different address, were sent to the Tolves at their New York 
address.  The Tolves 
admit to having received this package sometime after November 25, 1999. 
     Pursuant to Tax Court Rule 90(c), matters set forth in a request for 
admissions are 
deemed admitted if the party on whom the request is served does not 
respond within 
30 days after service.  As the Tolves did not respond to the request for 
admissions at all, 
their substance was deemed to be admitted.   
     On the date set for trial the Tolves filed a motion to withdraw the 
deemed 
admissions, a motion to amend the petition, and a motion for partial 
summary judgment 
regarding whether the Consent extended the statute of limitations for 
assessment of any 
item other than the tax.  The Commissioner objected to the Tolves' motions 
and sought 
summary judgment that the entire amount was due.  The Tax Court denied the 
Tolves' 
motions.  By doing so the Tax Court effectively disposed of all the issues 
in the 
underlying action because the deemed admissions established the 
"timeliness" of the 
assessment and that they owed the amount of the tax, the additions to tax, 
and the interest, 
as listed in the deficiency notice.  The Tax Court accordingly granted the 
Commissioner's 
motion and entered judgment for the entire amount claimed by the IRS to be 
due.  The 
Tolves now appeal from the Tax Court's orders. 
                              II. 
     The Tax Court exercised jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 26 
U.S.C. 
("I.R.C.")  6214 and 7442.  We have jurisdiction to review the Tax 
Court's final order 
pursuant to I.R.C.  7482(a). 
     We review both the Tax Court's refusal to permit the withdrawal of 
deemed 
admissions and its refusal to allow the petition to be amended for abuse 
of discretion.  
Cureton v. Nt'l Collegiate Athletic Assoc., 252 F.3d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 
2001) (amend 
petition); Am. Auto. Assoc. v. AAA Legal Clinic of Jefferson Crooke, 930 
F.2d 1117, 
1119 (5th Cir. 1991) (admissions); 999 v. C.I.T. Corp., 776 F.2d 866, 869 
(9th Cir. 1985) 
(admissions).  Our standard of review is therefore a narrow one.  We have 
explained that 
a finding of an abuse of discretion is appropriate only "if no reasonable 
man would adopt 
the [tax] court's view.  If reasonable men could differ as to the 
propriety of the action 
taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court 
abused its discretion."  
Washington v. Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 89 F.3d 1031, 
1044 (3d Cir. 
1996). 
     A.   Motion to Withdraw Admissions 
     The Tolves' admissions essentially resolve issues of "timeliness" and 
the amount 
due in the IRS's favor.  The Tax Court correctly referenced the applicable 
standard 
governing the withdrawal of admissions in such proceedings.  Rule 90(f) in 
pertinent part 
provides: 
     [W]ithdrawal or modification may be permitted when the presentation 
of the 
     merits of the case will be subserved thereby, and the party who 
obtained the 
     admission fails to satisfy the Court that the withdrawal or 
modification will 
     prejudice such party in prosecuting such party's case or defense on 
the merits.   
      
Two issues are presented:  first, whether the merits are "subserved," or 
promoted, by 
allowing the Tolves to withdraw their admissions, and, second, whether the 
IRS is 
prejudiced in any way by the same.   
               1.   Subserving the Merits 
     In its order the Tax Court reasoned that the merits were not 
"subserved" because 
the Tolves' statute of limitations defense was without merit.  It based 
this conclusion on a 
terse determination that the meaning of "tax" on the form was clear.  
While the Tax 
Court's view of "tax" was a correct statement of tax court decisions as to 
the meaning of 
"tax," the Tax Court borrowed these rulings as conclusive on the issue of 
the plain 
meaning of "tax" in the specific Consent executed by the Tolves.  By 
ruling that the 
meaning of "tax" was clear, the Tax Court foreclosed any discussion of the 
proper 
interpretation of the form itself, which, as we have noted, contained 
specific typed 
limiting language.  We view the issue as to whether the Consent extended 
the statute of 
limitations as to only the tax, or also as to the additions to tax and 
interest, to be not quite 
as clear cut as the IRS suggests or the Tax Court concluded.   
     The Supreme Court has said that a consent to extend the time period 
for the 
assessment of tax is "not a contract . . . [but is] essentially a 
unilateral waiver of a defense 
by the taxpayer."  Stange v. United States, 282 U.S. 270, 276 (1931).  
However, courts 
have analyzed taxpayer consent in contractual interpretation terms.  See 
Ripley v. 
Commissioner, 103 F.3d 332, 337 (4th Cir. 1996); Kronish v. Commissioner, 
90 T.C. 
684, 693 (1988).  In interpreting the waiver agreement in terms of 
contract principles, 
courts have looked to the "plain meaning" of the form.  See United States 
v. Hodgekins, 
28 F.3d 610, (7th Cir. 1994); Stenclik v. Commissioner, 907 F.2d 25, 27 
(2d Cir. 1990).   
We conclude that the plain meaning of the form before us is not limited to  
the statutory 
meaning of the words "tax" or "deficiency."  Rather the meaning of the 
form can only be 
determined by examining the contract language and deciding whether its 
meaning is, in 
fact, "plain."  We conclude that it is not.  The typed words of limitation 
reference very 
specific items of tax resulting from adjustments relating solely to their 
investment in 
Stu-Co.  We cannot say that they clearly include additions and interest, 
as those words 
appear nowhere in the typed portion (or in the form itself, for that 
matter).  As the tax 
court has explained, the meaning of the form must be determined by looking 
at the 
specific restricted form at issue.  See Ferguson v. Commissioner, 64 
T.C.M. (CCH) 
431(1992) (explaining that in order to determine whether amounts assessed 
by the IRS 
were covered by the consent, the court would focus on the "extensive and 
detailed 
language of the restriction"). 
     In Anthony v. United States, 987 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1992), the Tenth 
Circuit 
Court of Appeals was called on to determine the meaning of the word 
"taxes" in a 
settlement agreement between the IRS and the taxpayer.  In that case, the 
IRS argued that 
the word "taxes" did not include interest.  The Tenth Circuit found that 
the meaning of 
"taxes" was ambiguous in the agreement, and therefore looked instead to 
the intent of the 
parties.  Id. at 673.  The court rejected the IRS's argument that they had 
not settled the 
claim for interest and that "taxpayers should have been aware of the 
additional interest."  
Id. at 673.  Interestingly, the IRS makes that same claim here, but makes 
it as the basis for 
the opposite conclusion   arguing that tax clearly includes interest.  The 
court in Anthony 
concluded that the parties' intent was to limit the taxpayers' liability 
to only the taxes 
themselves. 
     Here, in denying the Tolves' motion, the Tax Court explained that "we 
[have] 
indicated that the word 'tax' in such waivers [as the form 872] included 
any applicable 
interest, penalty or other additions to tax."  It then references tax 
court rulings as to the 
meaning of "tax" in the context of a standard form.  Pleasanton Gravel Co. 
v. 
Commissioner, 85 T.C. 839 (1985) (citing Picard v. Commissioner, 28 T.C. 
955, 961 
(1957)).  This may be a correct reading of the word "tax," but this should 
not end the 
consideration of the meaning of the Consent at issue here in light of the 
additional typed 
portion containing limiting language.  The Tolves contend, and we agree, 
that this 
language could well be viewed as distinguishing the consent from the 
unrestricted consent 
in the cases relied on by the IRS and the Tax Court, such as Pleasanton 
Gravel and 
Picard, which only considered the meaning of "tax" in the form without 
additional 
qualification.  For this reason, the Tax Court was wrong to simply adopt 
the reasoning of 
those courts as to "tax" without considering the meaning of the form, 
including additional 
language included on the Tolves' consent. 
     As we find ambiguity in the meaning of the form, the parties 
intentions should 
have been explored in determining the meaning of the form.  Further 
proceedings before 
the Tax Court would be required in order to resolve this issue. 
               2.   Prejudice 
     However, we must consider the element of prejudice that will result 
here if the 
parties now need to explore their respective intentions in entering into 
the Consent many 
years ago.  If the inquiry into the meaning of tax at this late date is 
allowed, the Tolves' 
having failed to raise it in their pleading challenging the deficiency 
assessment, the 
government would be forced to adduce evidence of intent at this late date.  
We think that 
unfair prejudice provides grounds for us to affirm the Tax Court's denial 
of the Tolves' 
motion, even though we disagree with its analysis in so doing.  Although 
the admission 
itself was received by the government only a few weeks before trial, we 
cannot help but 
consider the fact that the Tolves' motion raises an entirely new issue, 
essentially an 
affirmative defense available to them when they challenged the assessment 
in 1988, and 
we find this fact persuades us to deny them the relief they seek.  The 
Tolves would have 
us not merely put the IRS to its proof regarding the merits of their 
liability, but rather, 
require it to defend on an entirely new basis, raising an affirmative 
defense separate and 
apart from the merits of the case.  Whether viewed as prejudicial, or as 
not "subserving 
the merits," we cannot conclude that denial of their motion by the Tax 
Court was an 
abuse of discretion. 
 
     B.   Motion to Amend the Petition 
     Similarly, we affirm the Tax Court's denial of the Tolves' motion to 
amend their 
petition to raise the statute of limitations defense at this late date 
regarding the assessment 
of additions to tax and interest, and to allege that Mrs. Tolve never 
executed or ratified 
the Form 872-A.  We find no reason to disturb the Tax Court's denial as we 
find that this 
issue also should have been raised by the Tolves when they challenged the 
deficiency 
assessment several years ago, in 1988, or at least not on the eve of 
trial.  They did not, 
and the Tax Court did not abuse its discretion in denying this motion. 
                              III. 
     Accordingly, we will AFFIRM the order of the Tax Court. 
_________________________
TO THE CLERK OF COURT: 
     Please file the foregoing Not Precedential Opinion. 
 
 
                              /s/ Marjorie O. Rendell 
                              Circuit Judge 
 
 
